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ONTOLOGICAL REDUCTIONISM
AND FAITH VERSUS REASON:
A CRITIQUE OF ADAMS ON OCKHAM
Alfred J. Freddoso

The purpose of this essay is to take issue with two aspects of Marilyn
Adams's monumental work William Ockham. Part I deals with Ockham's
ontology, arguing (i) that Adams does not sufficiently appreciate the use
Ockham makes of the principle of ontological parsimony in his attempt to
refute the thesis that there are extramental universals or common natures and
(ii) that she sets an implausibly high standard of success for Ockham's project
of showing that the only singular entities are substances and qualities. Part
II argues that Adams fails to provide a convincing defense of Ockham's
'anti-secularist' answer to the question of how Christian thinkers should react
to prima facie conflicts between the deliverances of faith and the deliverances
of reason.

Marilyn Adams's massive work William Ockham is the best comprehensive
study of Ockham's thought ever written in English or, as far as I know, in
any other language. 1 Without a doubt, it will be the standard secondary source
on Ockham's philosophy and theology for a long time to come.
Among the numerous virtues of Adams's book is its sustained (and, to my
mind, highly successful) attempt to root out many of the now tiresome misrepresentations of Ockham 's writings which continue to be passed down from
generation to generation by historians of philosophy, natural science, and
theology.2 Shorn of these misinterpretations, Ockham's intellectual legacy
turns out to be far less titillating than the wholesale subversion of Christian
Aristotelianism that he is commonly credited with (or blamed for). Indeed,
Adams's work makes it abundantly clear that Ockham's own ostensible
agenda is a distinctly conservative one for an early fourteenth-century
thinker, viz., to synthesize Aristotle's philosophy with the Catholic faith.
Nonetheless, within the context of medieval Aristotelianism Ockham is a
brilliant and in many ways controversial thinker, and by setting the record
straight on just which positions Ockham actually held, Adams has cleared
the way for genuinely fruitful historical and philosophical discussions of his
thought. My hope is that the present essay will merit this description.
My purpose is to take issue with Adams on two large and relatively indeFAITH AND PHILOSOPHY
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pendent topics, viz., Ockham's ontological reductionism (Part I) and his conception of the relation between faith and reason (Part II). Section A of Part
I is devoted to showing that Adams fails to recognize the central role played
by the principle of ontological parsimony in Ockham's attempt to refute the
claim that there are extra mental universals or common natures, while in
section B I argue that she burdens Ockham with an unjustifiably high standard
of success in his attempt to establish the thesis that the only singular entities
are substances and qualities. In Part II I propose to show that Adams does
not provide a convincing vindication of Ockham's answer to the question of
how Christian philosophers ought to deal with apparent conflicts between the
deliverances of faith and the deliverances of reason. My strategy here is to
develop in some detail the striking contrast between Aquinas and Ockham
on this important issue and to argue on that basis that any persuasive defense
of Ockham against Aquinas must go deeper than Adams suggests.
I. Ockham's Ontological Reductionism

Ockham is obsessed with ontology, so much so that his singlemindedness
at times distracts him from deeper and more pressing matters. Still, it is in
doing ontology that he is at his philosophical best.
As Ockham sees it, ontology is the site of the two worst blunders in philosophy. The first is the postulation of extramental universals:
Some claim that besides singular entities there are universal entities, and that
singular entities as conceptualized are the subjects in singular propositions
and universal entities as conceptualized are the parts of universal propositions. But this opinion, inasmuch as it claims that in addition to singular
things there are extramental entities that exist in those things, I regard as
altogether absurd and as destructive of Aristotle's whole philosophy, of all
knowledge, and of all truth and reason, and [I believe] that [this opinion] is
the worst error in philosophy-an error rejected by Aristotle in Metaphysics
VII-and that those who hold it are incapable of knowledge. 3

The second mistake is embodied by the assumption that distinct linguistic
terms must signify distinct entities:
The source of many errors in philosophy is the claim that a distinct signified
thing always corresponds to a distinct word in such a way that there are as
many distinct entities being signified as there are distinct names or words
doing the signifying.4

Ockham's reductionistic program in ontology consists of a two-phased
assault on these twin errors. He lays the foundation for both phases by contentiously insisting from the start that Aristotle's categories constitute a classification of terms and not of entities. Consequently, one cannot justifiably
assume without argument that every term falling into one of the categories,
i.e., every categorematic term, signifies a distinct entity. In the first phase of
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his program Ockham argues, against the friends of extramental universals
and common natures, that whatever exists is singular and hence not common
or capable of being shared. The corresponding semantic thesis is that
categorematic terms signify only singular entities. In the second phase he
argues, against those who posit relations, points, lines, surfaces, times, positions, etc., as distinct entities that every singular entity is either a substance
or a quality. Here the corresponding semantic thesis is that only the categories
of substance and quality contain absolute terms; all the other categories are
composed exclusively of connotative terms, each of which signifies, albeit
in its own distinctive way, just substances and/or qualities. Let's look at these
two phases a bit more closely.
A. Phase One
The first phase, discussed by Adams on pp. 3-141, centers on the category
of substance and, more particularly, on the classical question of whether
natural kind terms in this category, i.e., species and genus terms such as
'human being' and 'animal,' signify common, as opposed to singular, entities.
Since none of his opponents subscribes to it, Ockham feels no need to refute
Platonic realism, according to which natural kind terms signify eternally and
necessarily existing universal entities that are exemplified by singular substances, but do not exist in those substances. s Instead, he zeroes in on 'moderate realism,' a cornerstone of which is the negative semantic thesis that
natural kind terms, whatever else they might signify, do not at any rate signify
singular substances as such.
Adams recounts Ockham's criticisms of no fewer than six versions of
moderate realism. The most straightforward among them, viz., those championed by Walter Burleigh and the early Duns Scotus, maintain that a singular
substance, in addition to having physical constituents (matter and form or, in
the case of a spiritual substance, form alone), also has metaphysical constituents that are signified by the natural kind terms true of it. For instance, the
matter/form composite which is Socrates has distinct metaphysical constituents answering to each of the common terms 'human being,' 'animal,' 'living
thing,' and 'substance.' These constituents, known as common natures, are
thought to provide a ground for metaphysical definitions and essential predications, and in this way to underwrite the possibility of scientific knowledge,
which within an Aristotelian framework is just the knowledge of essences or
natures. 6
Other versions of moderate realism, including those espoused by Thomas
Aquinas and Henry of Harclay, resist precise description. They seem very
close to Ockham's own conceptualist theory in their ontological commitments, though not in what they say about the signification of natural kind
terms.7
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I will confine my remarks here to the two more straightforward versions.
According to Burleigh, a natural kind term signifies a common nature that
exists whole and entire in each singular substance of which the term is true.
Accordingly, Socrates's humanity is numerically identical with the humanity
of every other human being. Corresponding theses hold for each of the common natures signified by the terms 'animal,' 'living thing,' 'substance,' etc.thus the need for a principle of individuation that makes singular substances
of the same species distinct from one another. What's more, each common
nature is 'really' (Le., numerically) distinct from all the others-and this
immediately raises the question of how the singular things constituted by
these discrete common natures can possess the strong intrinsic unity Aristotle
attributes to primary substances. Ockham concocts a wide array of objections,
some of them ingenious, against Burleigh's position, but Adams believes this
to be the one form of moderate realism that can withstand Ockham's onslaught (pp. 38 and 67-69).
A bit more subtle is Scotus's early theory, according to which the common
natures signified by the kind terms true of a given singular substance are
entities that (i) in themselves have a unity less than numerical unity and are
hence shareable, (ii) are 'contracted' by an individual difference (a thisness
or haecceity) to yield the singular substance, which has full numerical unity,
and (iii), when contracted by the individual difference, are (a) really identical
with one another and with the individual difference and yet (b) 'formally'
distinct from one another and from the individual difference. «iiia) is meant
to preserve the unity of the substance.) On this theory Socrates's humanity
is really distinct from Plato's humanity and really identical with, though
formally distinct from, both Socrates's animality and Socrates's individual
difference. In response, Ockham argues at length against the very possibility
of an extra mental distinction between real entities which is merely a formal
and not a real distinction. After thoroughly examining these arguments,
Adams concludes that they undermine both the earlier and the later accounts
Scotus gives of the formal distinction (pp. 46-59).
What surprises me is that Adams not only plays down Ockham's use of the
principle of ontological parsimony in the reductionistic program as a whole,
but completely ignores its role here in the first phase. This principle, known
popularly as Ockham's razor, dictates that entities are not to be multiplied
beyond necessity. True, Ockham does not explicitly mention the principle in
the long tract on universals and common natures in Ordinatio J.8 Yet he in
fact employs it there as his most potent weapon against both Burleigh and
Scotus. Or so, at least, I will now argue.
Ockham's clearest formulation of the principle goes something like this:
When a number n of entities (or types of entity) is sufficient to make a
proposition p true, then it is gratuitous to posit more than n entities (or types
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of entity) in order to account for p's truth. 9 So stated, the principle constitutes
a methodological constraint on the construction of ontological theories. The
ontologist, on Ockham's view, aims to determine which general categories
of being must be posited in order to render true the propositions included in
the generally agreed upon 'data' of ontology. The entities thus posited are
the things signified by-in technical terminology, the significata of-the
categorematic terms occurring in those propositions. Given this conception
of ontology, the postulation of universals or common natures is justifiable
only if one can argue persuasively that such entities alone can adequately
serve as the significata of the natural kind terms contained in the data propositions:
[A universal] entity should not be posited except to preserve the essential
predication of one thing with respect to another, or to preserve scientific
knowledge of things and the definitions of things. These are the arguments
suggested by Aristotle on behalf of Plato's view. 10

Ockham's opponents seem to concur with this general understanding of the
ontologist's task. At the very least, they contend that unless universals or
common natures exist, there cannot be any true statements about similarity
relations, any true essential predications, any objective metaphysical definitions, any scientific knowledge about extramental reality, etc.
Both Ockham and his interlocuters, then, presuppose that ontology is a
theoretical or postulational, rather than a purely descriptive, enterprise. I do
not know exactly how to characterize the difference between postulational
and descriptivist approaches to ontology. but it is only with the help of some
such distinction that we can understand why certain philosophers take
Ockham's razor to be an utterly obvious methodological constraint in doing
ontology, while others deem it just as obviously irrelevant to the task of
delineating the most general categories of being. Numbered among the latter
is Nicholas Wolterstorff. who maintains that ontology is "descriptive, not
explanatory"ll and says this about Ockham's razor:
[One] reason for the reluctance to admit that there are predicable universals
is adherence to the popular but puzzling dictum that we ought not multiply
entities beyond necessity. Seldom is it clear what is meant by this. What
might sometimes be meant by it is that we ought not to say that there is or
exists a certain entity, or that there are or exist entities of a certain sort, unless
we find it necessary to do so. Or what might be meant is that we ought not
to refer to entities unless we find it necessary to do so .... [But] what we wish
to do [as ontologists] is find out whether there are predicable universals;
whether for this or that purpose it is necessary to say that there are, or to
refer to them, is really quite a different matter. 12

On pp. 156-161, while discussing the second phase of Ockham's program,
Adams expresses similar reservations about the principle and Ockham's use
of it.
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Be that as it may, my purpose here is not to assess or even to clarify the
debate between postulationalists and descriptivists. I merely want to show
how Ockham uses his razor against Scotus and Burleigh. The postulational
conception of ontology enables us to distinguish two different kinds of arguments that a conceptualist like Ockham might employ against realists. First,
there are direct arguments, which try to establish that the various theories
propounded by realists suffer from insuperable deficiencies. One might argue,
as Ockham does, that the realist theories have absurd consequences or that
they fail to save the data. As noted above, Adams judges that these direct
arguments succeed against Scotus but not against Burleigh. However, in the
Ordinatio discussion of universals Ockham also employs indirect arguments,
i.e., arguments meant to show that even if the realist theories are internally
coherent and adequate to preserve the data, those data can nonetheless be
accommodated equally well by a coherent theory that does not posit any
common natures at all. He argues, for example, that common natures are not
required to undergird the truth of propositions about how substances resemble
one another in various ways and to various degrees; similar arguments focus
on essential predications, metaphysical definitions, and the possibility of
scientific knowledge. 13 What follows, given the principle of parsimony, is
that even if Ockham's direct arguments against Burleigh and Scotus failindeed, even in the absence of such arguments-he still triumphs as long as
he can show that his own more economical theory posits enough significata
to make the data true. Ockham's indirect arguments are in fact very powerful;
as I see it, they effectively defeat the straightforward versions of moderate
realism. But my main point here is simply this: Ockham clearly presupposes,
as Adams should have realized, that the principle of parsimony stands behind
these arguments.
Ockham's own positive account of universals repudiates the notion that singular substances have metaphysical constituents of the sort described above.
Every real entity is singular in and of itself. So no problem of individuation is
generated by the mere fact that kind terms apply to singular substances, and there
is no need to posit individual differences that contract common natures to yield
such substances. But how is it that certain mental, spoken, and written terms,
though singular in being, are universal in signification? And what do they signify
if not common natures? To take the second question first, Ockham replies that
what they signify are none other than the singular entities of which they are truly
predicable. 14 For instance, the kind term 'human being' signifies all and only the
singular substances of which 'human being' is truly predicable, and it is a
common or universal term because it has the capacity to signify many human
beings in such a way that it signifies no one of them more than any other. In
response to the first question, Ockham asserts that a mental common term has
the capacity to signify many singulars by its very nature, whereas spoken and
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written common terms have this capacity only because of the linguistic conventions by which they are subordinated to the corresponding mental terms.
(On pp. 121-141 Adams lays out the problems attendant upon this doctrine
of the natural signification of mental terms.)
So the conclusion of the first phase of Ockham's ontological program is
that every entity is singular. The only universals are universal terms, and they
are universal not in their being but in their signification alone.

B. Phase Two
Now for the second phase of the program, which Adams addresses on pp.
143-313. Medieval Aristotelians generally hold that every singular entity is either
(i) a substance, (ii) a part of a substance (whether an integral part or an essential
part such as matter or form), or (iii) an accident apt by its nature to inhere in a
substance. In the second phase, Ockham turns to accidents and tries to establish
that the only accidents are qualities-where, as noted above, the parallel semantic thesis is that all terms in the categories other than substance and quality are
connotative rather than absolute. IS
According to Ockham, connotative terms signify substances and qualities
while connoting various conditions of applicability that do not in themselves
implicate the existence of any entities besides substances and qualities. So, for
instance, no singular entities distinct from substances or qualities serve as the
significata of, say, relative terms such as 'mother,' 'similar to,' 'equal to,' and
'to the left of,' or of quantitative terms such as 'seven,' 'double,' 'point,' 'line,'
and 'surface,' or of temporal terms such as 'now,' 'yesterday,' and 'ten years
from now,' or of action terms such as 'cause,' 'create,' and 'generate' or their
passive counterparts. To support this contention, Ockham proceeds through the
accidental categories one by one, employing both direct and indirect arguments
to impugn the postulation of relations, quantities, times, positions, actions, etc.,
as distinct entities. 16 The arguments are by and large as fascinating as they are
complicated, but in the end he invariably concludes that propositions in which
the relevant connotative terms occur require for their truth no ontological
furniture other than substances and qualities.
Adams supplies a detailed analysis of Ockham's arguments concerning the
key categories of quantity and relation. However, in assessing this second phase
of Ockham's program (pp. 287-313) she sets a criterion for success which is too
high both in itself and from Ockham's point of view. According to Adams,
Ockham must show here, as he does not, (i) that the mental language-which
Adams claims to be 'logically perspicuous' -contains no connotative terms at
all, and hence (ii) that connotative terms are eliminable without loss from spoken
and written language. Her claim, in other words, is that Ockham's ontological
reductionism entails a linguistic reductionism as well, so that the second phase
of his program succeeds only to the extent that he can provide plausible
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translations, duly shorn of connotative terms, for all propositions in which
such terms occur.
To be sure, Ockham does explicitly maintain that every connotative term
has a nominal definition that expresses its conditions of applicability, and he
also asserts that the mental language contains no distinct synonymous terms.
Adams makes the further assumption that a connotative term is synonymous
with its nominal definition and infers that on Ockham's reckoning every
spoken or written proposition involving a connotative term corresponds to a
mental proposition that contains only the nominal definition of that term. She
then suggests, without corroboration from any text, that nominal definitions
themselves contain no connotative terms and concludes that Ockham at least
"should have" held that all connotative terms are eliminable:
Ockham maintains that all connotative terms are susceptible of nominal definitions .... And a development of his logic ... would conclude that all connotative terms are synonymous with complexes of primitive syncategorematics
and absolute terms that name substances or qualities. If so, Ockham should
have ... regarded all connotative terms and hence all terms in the categories
other than substance and quality as in principle eli minable in favor of such
complexes. (p. 298)

This picture, which I must confess having been attracted to in the past, now
strikes me as essentially distorted. To begin with, it is clear beyond doubt
that Ockham himself feels no obligation to prove that connotative terms are
eliminable. First, when he denies that the mental language contains synonymous terms, he is using 'synonymous' in a very strict sense according to
which two synonymous terms signify exactly the same things in exactly the
same way, and there is at least some doubt about whether he holds that a
nominal definition is synonymous in this sense with its definitum.17 Second,
even if we grant that a connotative term and its nominal definition are synonymous in this strict sense, there is absolutely no evidence for the contention
that on Ockham's view nominal definitions never contain connotative terms.
As a matter of fact, in the case of relative terms that mutually imply one
another's applicability (e.g., 'parent' and 'child') he claims precisely the
opposite. In Quodlibeta Septem VI, ques. 24, he asserts that when two relative
names are mutual, "neither one's nominal definition can be expressed except
through the other."18 And in another place he unambiguously-and evidently
without embarrassment-states that each of the non-relative connotative
terms 'quantity,' 'motion,' 'time,' 'figure,' 'density,' and 'rarity' is such that
a relative term, and hence a connotative term, occurs in its nominal definition. 19 Third, and perhaps most striking of ali, he explicitly speaks of connotative concepts (i.e., mental terms) in several places-most notably in
Quodlibeta Septem V, ques. 25, where he explicates the distinction between
absolute and connotative concepts. 20
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So Ockham, in contrast to Adams, does not think that the success of the
second phase of his program hinges on his being able to show that every
categorematic term in the mental language is absolute and not connotative.
Nor, it seems to me, can one argue plausibly that he should have thought
otherwise. He clearly does believe that the truth of propositions containing
connotative terms can be preserved without assigning any entities other than
substances and qualities as the significata of those terms, and from this belief
it follows that any entity signified by a connotative term is also signified by
an absolute term in either the category of substance or the category of quality.
But I find it exceedingly difficult to detect a nexus between this thesis and
the claim that all connotative terms are eliminable.
Consider a simple example. Ockham claims, plausibly, that the written
proposition
(1) Socrates and Plato are similar to one another in being wise,

which contains the relative term 'similar,' is necessarily equivalent in truth
value to the written conjunctive proposition
(2) Socrates is wise and Plato is wise,

whose categorematic terms obviously do not signify any entities that are not
also signified by the terms of (1). According to Ockham and most of his
opponents as well, the truth of (2) requires the existence of just four
significata: two substances (Socrates and Plato) and two qualities (the wisdom inhering in Socrates and the wisdom inhering in Plato). But, Ockham
maintains, if these four entities are also signified by the terms of (I), and if
(1) and (2) are necessarily equivalent, then there is no reason to believe that
the term 'similar' must signify two additional accidental entities, viz., a similarity to Plato that inheres in Socrates and a similarity to Socrates that inheres
in Plato.
Now it seems clear that in order to make this argument, Ockham does not
have to assert that (1) and (2) say exactly the same thing in exactly the same
way; nor does he have to maintain that the term 'similar' signifies Socrates
and Plato in the same way that the proper names 'Socrates' and 'Plato' do or
in the same way that the term 'wise' does. In short, he has no reason to deny
that (1) and (2) correspond to distinct mental propositions or that the term
'similar' occurs in the mental language. He needs to claim only that, contrary
to what his opponents contend, the term 'similar' signifies just substances
and qualities, though in its own distinctive way.
Of course, Ockham must supply stories like the one about the term 'similar'
for at least a wide range of connotative terms. Perhaps he does not go far
enough in discharging this duty. Still, the point of such stories is simply to
clarify the ontological ramifications of the use of connotative terms and not
to show that the mental language contains no such terms. This may mean that
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the mental language fails to qualify as a 'logically perspicuous language' in
Adams's sense. But is Ockham's project thereby rendered any less interesting
or promising? I think not.

II. Faith and Reason in Aquinas and Ockham
Unlike Aquinas, Ockham never wrote anything resembling a treatise on the
relation between faith and reason. Yet a tolerably clear picture of his thinking
on this matter emerges from those texts in which he deals directly with topics
in natural and revealed theology. Adams devotes a lengthy chapter (Chap.
22, pp. 961-1010) to faith and reason, concentrating especially on the question of how Christian thinkers should deal with prima/acie conflicts between
the deliverances of faith and the deliverances of reason. In the end, however,
she allows Ockham to beg the question against St. Thomas and overlooks, or
at least mutes, fairly obvious criticisms of Ockham himself.
Chapter 22 concludes with a debate between Ockham and his Thomistic
critics, but here I will bypass the critics and go straight to the tract on faith
and reason found in the opening nine chapters of St. Thomas's Summa Contra
Gentiles. Although I agree with St. Thomas on the issue under dispute, my
purpose here is not to defend him against Ockham, but only to grant him a
fair hearing and to show that Adams's attempt to vindicate Ockham fails.
A. St. Thomas on Conflicts Between Faith and Reason

St. Thomas portrays his own project of explicating the Christian faith and
refuting objections to it as a continuation of the 'Gentile' philosopher's quest
for wisdom, i.e., for a systematic understanding of "the truth which is the
origin of all truth, viz., the truth that pertains to the first principle of being
for all things" (Chapter 1).21 This pursuit of wisdom, identified on Biblical
grounds with the search for God and simultaneously identified with what
Aristotle calls First Philosophy, is the "most perfect, noble, useful and joyful
of human endeavors" (Chapter 2), mainly because the limited grasp of 'divine
truth' possible in this life furnishes us with a foretaste of that evident and
face-to-face knowledge of God which is, according to Christian revelation,
the principal constituent of ultimate human fulfillment.
Notice that philosophy, understood expansively as the endeavor to articulate and defend a comprehensive metaphysical vision of the world, is free to,
indeed obliged to, draw upon every source of truth available to us as human
beings. st. Thomas distinguishes two ways in which divine truth is made
manifest to us, viz., through revelation and through natural reason, where the
latter ostensibly includes every source of truth distinct from Sacred Scripture
and the teachings of the Church. He realizes that many will balk at his
unabashed insistence that Christian revelation counts as a legitimate source
of truth, but since this issue does not separate him from Ockham, I will simply
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ignore it here. st. Thomas is in any case more concerned with another question. Mindful of the metaphysical achievements of Plato, Aristotle, and their
philosophical progeny, he asks whether reason can serve as an alternate
source of the truths revealed to us by God and, more specifically, whether
reason can demonstrate such truths by arguments from evident premises. The
answer is both yes and no:
In those things that we profess about God there are two types of truths. For
there are some truths about God that exceed every capacity of human reason,
such as that God is [both] three and one. But there are other truths that natural
reason is also capable of arriving at, such as that God exists, that there is one
God, and others of this sort. Indeed, philosophers, led by the light of natural
reason, have proved these truths about God demonstratively. (Chapter 3)

Although he thus divides revealed truths into what he elsewhere calls the
mysteries of the faith, which "exceed every capacity of human reason," and
the preambles of the faith, which reason can at least in principle establish on
its own, st. Thomas does not deem it foolish for us to accept the preambles
on faith, i.e., to assent to them because we freely place our trust in God
revealing them rather than because they have been rendered intellectually
compelling to us by arguments from evident premises. In fact, he argues in
Chapter 4 that because of the vicissitudes of human life, the inherent complexity of the subject, and the debility of human reason, very few people
come to the cognition of any preamble on the basis of an argument that turns
it into an object of evident knowledge (scientia) rather than of faith (fides).
However, accepting the preambles on faith, though wholly proper and even
praiseworthy in our present state, is intellectually inferior to having evident
knowledge of them. 22 For, other things being equal, the more evident our
cognition of God is, the more closely we approach true human flourishing.
In Chapters 3-6 St. Thomas addresses several questions immediately
prompted by this distinction between the mysteries and the preambles: Is it
reasonable to believe that there are truths about divine matters which in
principle exceed our natural capacities for systematic understanding? Wasn't
it pointless for God to reveal truths that natural reason is capable of establishing on its own? Is it proper for God to demand that we accept on faith
propositions that reason cannot even in principle attain to? Isn't it frivolous
and intellectually irresponsible for us to assent to the mysteries of the faith?
I will not deal directly with these questions here, since, once again, they do
not divide st. Thomas from Ockham.
We can begin to approach the genuine differences between Ockham and
Aquinas by observing that the distinction between the mysteries and the
preambles suggests a second conception of philosophy which is narrower than
the one adumbrated above. On this conception, philosophy draws its premises
from natural reason alone and is thereby set off from theology, which takes
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revealed propositions as its starting points and tries, within the limits of
human finitude, to understand them systematically. This distinction between
philosophy and theology became pivotal in the thirteenth century when
Aristotle's works flooded into European universities, and since then it has
served within Catholic universities as the theoretical foundation for the separation of philosophy departments from theology departments.
St. Thomas singles out this narrower sense of philosophy in part because
it helps him clarify what he regards as the proper posture Christians should
assume toward secular learning in general and secular philosophy in particular. The history of Christianity has been marked by recurrent and bitter
disputes over this issue. From the earliest times some Christians (I will dub
them 'anti-secularists') have denounced secular 'wisdom' as an adversary of
Christianity. They have sternly warned fellow Christians about the pitfalls of
syncretism, and they have acerbically asked why, if not because of an obsequious (and typically futile) desire to curry favor with intellectually prestigious unbelievers, a Christian might want to study, say, the books of Aristotle
with the same intensity as the books of Sacred Scripture. They recall that
when St. Paul preached in Athens, he was ridiculed by the philosophers, who
in their pride preferred the wisdom of the world to the wisdom of God (Acts
17:16-34). What, they ask disdainfully, has Jerusalem to do with Athens?
Christianity is itself a philosophy or wisdom that competes with secular
philosophies and aims to displace them. (Observe the fallback here to the
broader conception of philosophy.)
1 do not mean to insinuate that Ockham is a full-fledged anti-secularist. He
does not, for instance, spurn efforts to articulate Christian doctrine with the
help of conceptual resources borrowed from secular philosophy.23 Nor does
he repudiate in theory the natural theologian's attempt to show that at least
some revealed truths can be established on grounds that unbelievers as such
should or at least can accept.
However, as we shall see shortly, he does evince anti-secularist leanings
on one important issue. All sides agree that because human reason stands in
need of the illumination of faith, it is not surprising that philosophers who
operate in ignorance of revelation often come to conclusions that are contrary
to the faith. According to anti-secularism, however, a Christian is not obliged
to refute such conclusions on their own terms, i.e., by appealing only to the
deliverances of reason. Indeed, anti-secularists allege that in many cases a
philosophical (in the narrow sense) refutation may well be impossible, given
that human sinfulness has rendered reason unreliable. Perhaps this means that
Christian doctrine will inevitably appear foolish in the eyes of secular philosophers. So be it. The Christian's task is to emulate St. Paul, who preached
the Gospel in its own terms and on its own terms even to the intellectually
sophisticated Athenians.
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It would be a mistake to suppose that St. Thomas does not feel the force
of these considerations or that he does not recognize a grain of truth in them.
To the contrary, he issues regular warnings of his own about the frailty of
human reason in its postlapsarian state and about the intellect's susceptibility
to prejudices and distortions that are induced by the affective disorders attendant upon human sinfulness. Nonetheless, he maintains that the effects of
sin do not prevent reason from functioning as an independent and inherently
trustworthy measure.of both truth and intellectual virtue. Just as, appearances
sometimes to the contrary, there can be no genuine conflict between the moral
law imposed upon us by God and the standards of moral perfection intrinsic
to human nature, so too there can be no genuine conflict between our divinely
imposed obligation to accept revealed truths and the standards of intellectual
perfection intrinsic to human nature. For the deliverances of faith and the
deliverances of reason both emanate from the same mentor:
The teacher's knowledge contains the very same thing that the teacher introduces into the soul of the student-unless [the teacher] teaches deceitfully,
which cannot be said of God. But the cognition of naturally known principles
is implanted in us by God, since God Himself is the author of our nature. So
these principles are also contained in the divine wisdom. Therefore, anything
contrary to principles of this sort is contrary to the divine wisdom; so it cannot
come from God. Therefore, those things that are held by faith on the basis
of divine revelation cannot be contrary to natural cognition. (Chapter 7)

As part of our nature we have strong inclinations to assent to certain evident
principles. Such inclinations, instilled in us by God, are irresistible (or nearly
so) for any human intellect that is operating normally, and they effect what
st. Thomas calls natural cognitions. So if God required us to accept on faith
propositions that run contrary to these natural cognitions, we would find
ourselves in the well-nigh desperate position of being obliged to assent to
propositions whose contraries are, under normal circumstances, irresistible
for us (or nearly so). God would in effect be commanding us to assent to
propositions that we cannot assent to without doing violence to ourselves as
human beings. Accepting revealed doctrines on faith would in that case be
the moral equivalent of ingesting mind-altering drugs that induce doubts
about evident propositions. (This, of course, is exactly how some unbelievers
view the situation.) St. Thomas asserts that because of God's essential veracity such a predicament is metaphysically impossible:
Our intellect is bound by conflicting considerations in such a way that it
cannot proceed to a cognition of what is true. Therefore, if contrary cognitions were instilled in us by God, our intellect would thereby be hindered
from cognizing the truth-ran effect] that cannot come from God. (Chapter

7)
According to St. Thomas, then, natural cognitions cannot by themselves
lead us into error. But if this is so, then philosophical objections to Christian
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doctrine can always in principle be shown not to follow from the evident
deliverances of reason:
From this it clearly follows that whatever arguments might be propounded
against the doctrines of the faith, they do not proceed correctly from first
principles, known per se, which are implanted in [our] nature. Thus, [such
arguments] do not have the force of demonstration, but instead are either
[merely] probable arguments or sophistical arguments. And so room is left
for answering them. (Chapter 7)

Someone might object that what St. Thomas says here, taken just by itself,
can be used to sanction the irrational rejection of a philosophical argument
that is overwhelmingly probable but falls short of satisfying the stringent
requirements for being a demonstration properly speaking. However, the
thrust of st. Thomas's remarks and his own theological methodology suggest
the following thesis, which is not vulnerable to the objection in question:
No philosophical argument or theory that entails a conclusion contrary to the
faith is warranted to so high a degree as to render its philosophical competitors (including its own negation) rationally unacceptable.

A detailed explication of this thesis would have to delve deeply into the
concepts of subjective probability and rational acceptability, but the thesis as
it stands will be sufficient for our present purposes, since, as will become
clear, Ockham rejects it on any plausible interpretation.
Now while revelation enhances a Christian thinker's ability to identify false
philosophical conclusions, it does not by itself supply a philosophical (in the
narrow sense) justification for rejecting the arguments that lead to those
conclusions. Only natural reason can do this. Further, the project of replying
to such arguments on their own terms is, according to st. Thomas, a demand
of intellectual virtue for Christians as a community (though not for each
individual) and an integral part of the Church's mission to reach out to those
intellectually sophisticated unbelievers who accept none of the theological
authorities Christians typically have recourse to:
Some of the [Gentiles], such as the Mohammedans and the pagans, do not agree
with us on the authority of any Scripture by means of which they could be won
over-in the way that we can argue with Jews by appealing to the Old Testament
and with heretics by appealing to the New Testament. But [the Mohammedans
and pagans] accept neither [the Old nor the New Testament]. Therefore, it is
necessary to revert to natural reason, which everyone is compelled to assent
to-although in divine matters reason is wanting. (Chapter 2)

This last remark confirms my previous contention that St. Thomas's optimism about our innate intellectual powers is tempered; he obviously believes
that reason de facto needs the guidance of revelation to do its best. Nonetheless, he just as clearly accords natural reason and philosophy (in the narrow
sense) a relative autonomy denied them by anti-secularists. Reason and faith
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are reliable sources of truth which are independent of one another, and because of this mutual independence they stand in a dynamic relationship. The
deliverances of faith not only disclose limits beyond which reason cannot go
without falling into error, but also steer reason toward more adequate philosophical theories and arguments, perhaps even suggesting some theories and
arguments that would otherwise go unnoticed. But just as important, the
deliverances of reason constrain the interpretation of the sources of revelation, viz., Sacred Scripture and the teaching tradition of the Church. Thus,
prima facie conflicts between philosophical conclusions and articles of the
faith may in some instances call for careful analysis of doctrinal statements
as well as of philosophical arguments. And, as the history of Christian theology amply attests, there is often room for legitimate disagreement over just
what the upshot of this mutual interaction between reason and faith is in
particular cases. 24 Even in as unified a tradition as that associated with the
Roman Catholic Church, official decrees that settle such disputes one way or
another are rare, and, like court decisions, they are normally rendered on
narrow grounds.

B. The Ockhamistic Alternative
Let us now return to Ockham. As regards natural theology, Ockham is
decidedly less sanguine than his predecessors about what reason unaided by
revelation can demonstrate in the strict sense about the existence and nature
of God. It is demonstrable, he believes, that there is a being such that no
being is prior to or more perfect than it, but it is not demonstrable that there
is just one such being.2s Moreover, although there are 'probable; i.e., plausible, philosophical arguments to the effect that one or another of the divine
perfections is actually possessed by some being, unaided reason cannot demonstrate in the strict sense that any being has any of these perfections.
Nonetheless, it is worth noting that by contemporary standards Ockham is
positively bullish on natural theology. Today it would be remarkable indeed
to find a theistic philosopher who claims to have demonstrated what Ockham
explicitly asserts to be demonstrable, viz., the existence of a being than which
none is more perfect. Ockham is no sceptic regarding natural theology, and
only historical shortsightedness could lead one to think otherwise.
As I intimated above, the real chasm separating Ockham from Aquinas
appears only when we turn to Ockham's views about how tensions between
faith and reason are to be resolved. Several examples come immediately to
mind, but I will focus on the doctrine of the Trinity, since Adams discusses
it in some detail (pp. 996-1007). According to this doctrine, a singular divine
nature with just one intellect and will is shared by three distinct divine
persons. The tension first arises when Ockham, after arguing on philosophical
grounds that there are no real relations and that relative terms are all merely
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connotative, concedes that the doctrine of the Trinity entails or at least
strongly suggests that the three divine persons are constituted by real relations
of knowing and loving which they bear to one another.
Given this apparent conflict between reason and faith, St. Thomas would
maintain that the philosophical theory (call it T) leading to the conclusion
that there are no real relations contains a 'philosophical' flaw, Le., an error
or infelicity that can at least in principle be discovered and rectified by natural
reason itself. In a case like this, revelation guides reason by prompting the
reexamination of a philosophical theory that it has exposed as unsound.
Ockham, however, does not see things this way. To be sure, T contains a
flaw, because it yields the false general conclusion that there are no real
relations. But it is only through revelation that we can so much as detect Ts
falsity, and so we should not expect the flaw in T to be one that reason can
rectify on its own. What's more, the fact that T contains this sort of flaw does
nothing to alter its status as the only rationally acceptable account of relations. Thus, although we must reject T in all its generality, the proper course
is to accept a modified, less general, version of T (call it 1'*) that applies to
all and only those cases about which revelation has nothing contrary to
say-even while we admit that there is no philosophical flaw in T and no
philosophical justification for preferring 1'* to T.
To relate this a bit more perspicuously to our discussion of st. Thomas, let
us suppose that a secular philosopher invokes T to pose an objection to the
doctrine of the Trinity. This philosopher argues that since, according to T,
there are no real relations, the doctrine is false.
In response, St. Thomas will maintain that the objection must emanate from
a theory that can reasonably be impugned and rejected on philosophical (in
the narrow sense) grounds alone. In keeping with what was said above, I take
this to mean that T is not so highly warranted on philosophical grounds as to
rule out its competitors as rationally unacceptable. The Christian philosopher
is thus charged with carrying out a careful critique of T and, if possible,
constructing a philosophical alternative to it.
Ockham, by contrast, seems prepared to hold that T, despite entailing conclusions contrary to the faith, is indeed warranted to such a degree that it renders
its philosophical competitors unacceptable on unrevealed grounds alone. His
response to the secular philosopher goes like this: "I know by faith that T is
mistaken, even though we share no common ground upon which I can argue my
case against T in a way that has some purchase on you. But because T is the only
acceptable philosophical account of relations, I do not propose to jettison it
entirely. Instead, I will substitute 1'* for T, so that we can agree at least on all
those cases that divine revelation does not speak to. You might find this response
deficient and even a bit annoying, since I have not tried to refute your objection
directly. But in this instance such a refutation is impossible."
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As Adams reports (pp. 999-1003), Ockham responds in like manner to the
objection that the doctrine of the Trinity violates general laws governing the
concept of identity. Since he believes that no philosophical account of identity which accommodates the doctrine is rationally acceptable, he simply
replies that principles such as the transitivity and symmetry of identity, while
they apply to all other cases, do not apply to the Trinity. For in this one
instance, known to us only by revelation, there are three distinct things (the
divine persons constituted by the relations), each of which is nonetheless
identical with the one divine nature. So we know by revelation that there is
an exception to the general principles in question, even though we have no
philosophical warrant for countenancing this exception. In contrast, St.
Thomas tries to show that the doctrine does not in fact breach any evident
laws concerning identity.
C. Adams's Defense of Ockham
I tum now to Adams's defense of Ockham. She begins by conceding that
on Ockham's view there can be ultimate conflicts between faith and reason:
Authority sometimes implies ... conclusions that are contrary to reason-e.g.,
that three things are one thing, or that there are relative things really distinct
from absolute things. Ockham always allows the claims of reason and experience to be defeated by contrary pronouncements of the Church, which
should lead 'every thought captive' .... Church pronouncements usually restrict themselves to the narrowest possible subject matter. They do not stipulate, for example, that whenever things are related, there is a relative thing
or things really distinct from the relata that relates them. To admit the latter
is, for Ockham, to take a step outside the bounds of reason. To grant the fully
general thesis [that whenever things are related, etc.] would be to multiply
miracles without any necessity. Ockham's method is thus to subordinate
reason and experience to Church authority, while keeping violations of reason
and experience to a minimum. (p. 1009)

But even here at the beginning the issues are skewed. St. Thomas's position
on faith and reason in no way implies that if real relations are required by
the doctrine of the Trinity, then it must be generally true that relative terms
signify real relations. He claims only (i) that this doctrine, even if it generates
exceptions to otherwise general truths, cannot be shown on philosophical
grounds to be rationally unacceptable, and thus (ii) that a Christian thinker
should assume from the start that the correct philosophical account of relations will have the conceptual resources to accommodate this doctrine, as
well as any exceptions it might engender, without inconsistency or incoherence. To illustrate by way of another example, st. Thomas himself believes
that in every case except for the Incarnation, an individual human nature
composed of soul and body constitutes a substance that at the same time is
a suppositum or ultimate subject of attributes, whereas Christ's individual
human nature is a substance that is not a suppositum. 26 But this exception
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coheres with st. Thomas's metaphysics because he has argued on philosophical grounds alone that it is possible for a substance not to satisfy the necessary conditions for being a suppositum. In the case at hand, the issue is not
Ockham's conviction that the doctrine of the Trinity entails exceptions to
otherwise general truths, but rather his willingness to countenance exceptions
that he takes to be philosophically incoherent and, in Adams's words, contrary to reason. Again, the issue is not his resolve to "subordinate reason and
experience to Church authority," but rather his belief that such subordination
sometimes involves the abdication of reason.
Adams, however, seems simply to assume with Ockham that there can be
ultimate conflicts between faith and reason, and then asks how a Christian
thinker should react to them. For example, suppose that such a thinker tentatively agrees with Ockham that all the philosophical theories about relations
which cohere with the doctrine of the Trinity are themselves rationally unacceptable. What then? Adams limits the choices to two, the worthier of which
is Ockham's:
The question is how a theologian should respond to a philosophical theory that
accommodates doctrinal claims ... , when after careful and honest assessment he
finds it to violate the canons of reason and experience. He can reject the theory
while treating the doctrinal theses as exceptions-which Ockham does. Or he
can conclude that he himself is incapable of evaluating the general theory even
though he finds it contradictory and/or unthinkable. In preferring the former
strategy to the latter, Ockham is expressing a certain confidence in his own ability
to assess philosophical theories. But if this is arrogant, I would ask which of us
is in a position to cast the first stone? (p. 10 10)

But this obviously begs the question against St. Thomas. What we expect,
but do not get from either Ockham or Adams, is a sustained defense of the
thesis that ultimate conflicts between faith and reason are possible-or at
least an attempt to rebut St. Thomas's arguments to the contrary. Those
arguments are certainly not immune to interesting objections. For instance,
one might argue that St. Thomas does not give sufficient weight to the epistemic effects of human sinfulness-a sinfulness which, God's veracity notwithstanding, has rendered reason untrustworthy even with respect to natural
cognitions. Unfortunately, Adams not only fails to carry the discussion
deeper, but also muddies the waters:
Ockham's critics charge that his method is tantamount to theologism. For in
allowing the philosopher to be informed by theology ... and admitting that Church
authorities and our natural faculties sometimes lead us in opposite directions, he
compromises the autonomy of philosophy. After reason and experience have
reached their conclusion, he must refer to Ecclesiastical pronouncements to see
whether and how their results must be qualified or reversed.
Further, they charge, Ockham's philosophical mistakes led to this deplorable
methodology. Had he the insight to see that Aquinas's positions, which harmo-
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nize faith and reason, are correct, or the humility to learn from him, Ockham
would have strayed less far, both substantively and methodologically.
In my opinion, there is a certain perversity in this objection. While ostensibly
blaming Ockham for allowing his theological commitments to restrict his
philosophical conclusions, it chides him for not regarding disharmony between a philosophical theory and Christian doctrine as a decisive indication
of philosophical wrongheadedness. (pp. 1009-1010)

Whatever "Ockham's critics" may say, we have seen enough to know that
st. Thomas himself acknowledges, indeed insists, that Christian philosophers
must be "informed by theology" and "must allow [their] theological commitments to restrict [their] philosophical conclusions." (How could he claim
otherwise, given his own practice?) Nor does he deny that there can be prima
facie conflicts between "Church authorities and our natural faculties." These
two concessions in themselves compromise neither the autonomy of reason
nor the autonomy of philosophy in the narrow sense. What's more, even if
some Thomists have, to Adams's evident chagrin, chided Ockham for his
failure to become a Thomist, it certainly does not follow from St. Thomas's
account of faith and reason that his own philosophical positions are the only
ones capable of accommodating the deliverances of faith.
What I find especially bewildering is that Adams, who throughout the rest
of her book takes great care to point out the moot aspects of Ockham's
thought, refrains from asking any pointed questions here. For instance, if
Ockham concedes that certain evident principles-say, those governing the
properties of identity-are, strictly speaking, false, then how can he justify
his own ostensible confidence in these principles when they are employed

outside of theological contexts? Only in the last paragraph of Chapter 22 does
Adams even begin to come to grips with this issue:
[Ockham] thinks that given who we are, we cannot but employ the laws of
thought and various inductive principles as reliable guides. As Augustine
taught, reason distinguishes us from the beasts, and God intends us to use it
to understand the created world. Nevertheless, given who God is, we shall
never be able to grasp Him fully thereby. When all is said and done, the
Christian philosopher must join the rest of the Church in thanking God for
grace to acknowledge and worship the mystery. (p. 1010)

But this is a red herring. St. Thomas does not claim that we can ever "grasp
God fully" or explain the mysteries of the faith in such a way as to render
them evident. In fact, he explicitly asserts just the opposite. The relevant
question is not whether the mysteries of the faith are in some sense beyond
reason, but whether they are contrary to reason. And if, as Ockham professes,
these mysteries are incompatible even with some of the most evident deliverances of reason, why should a Christian regard reason as a generally reliable
guide for understanding the created world? Why not instead adopt a Humean
pessimism with regard to reason and simply dismiss metaphysics as an arena
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in which, to quote the redoubtable Philo, "we know not how far we ought to
trust our vulgar methods of reasoning?"27 In short, how can Ockhamists
justifiably keep their limited anti-secularism from evolving into full-fledged
anti-secularism? Adams does not say.
Nor does she point out that Ockham's methodology runs the risk of closing
off theological inquiry at too early a stage. Ockham seems to assume that the
deliverances of faith are easily identifiable. The theologian simply compares
them to the theories delivered up by philosophers and makes the requisite
modifications in the latter. Revelation thus serves as a check on reason, but
reason apparently cannot serve as an independent check on the interpretation
of the sources of revelation. (After all, as Ockham sees it, faith sanctions
propositions that reason takes to be absurd.) What's more, on Ockham's view
reason and faith do not guide one another. Instead, reason reaches its conclusions and then revelation qualifies those conclusions without initiating either
a reexamination of the theories that led to the conclusions in the first place
or a careful analysis of the deliverances of faith. st. Thomas's alternative
seems not only more subtle but much more consonant with the practice of
the best Christian theologians, himself included.
I do not mean to imply that these criticisms are unanswerable within an
Ockhamistic framework. I only mean to say that Adams should have addressed them forthrightly. In the final analysis, I found this the least luminous
section of an otherwise stellar book.
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NOTES
1. William Ockham (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1987), two
volumes, 1402 pp. In what follows unannotated page numbers constitute references to this
book.

References to Ockham will be taken from the critical edition of his philosophical and
theological works: Guillelmus de Ockham, Opera Philosophica (hereafter: OP), volumes
1-VII (St. Bonaventure, NY: Franciscan Institute Press, 1974-1988), and Opera Theologica
(hereafter: 01), volumes I-X (St. Bonaventure, NY: Franciscan Institute Press, 19671986).
2. Here are a few of the common notions about Ockham which Adams exposes as errors:
(i) that his nominalist (or, better, conceptualist) theory of universals directly entails
conventionalism with respect to natural kind terms and so undermines the possibility of
genuinely scientific knowledge (pp. 109-41 and 287-305); (ii) that he posits qualities as
entities distinct from substances only because such entities are required by the Catholic
doctrine of transubstantiation (pp. 277-79); (iii) that his account of the intuitive cognition
of particulars leads to scepticism regarding perceptual beliefs (pp. 588-94 and 625-29);
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(iv) that in attributing actuality and extension to primary matter in itself, he anticipates
Descartes's identification of matter with extension (pp. 690-95); (v) that his analysis of
causation savors of Humean empiricism and engenders scepticism regarding beliefs about
particular causal connections (pp. 741-98); (vi) that he is wholly sceptical about philosophical arguments for God's existence (pp. 966-79); (vii) that his Christology succumbs
to the Nestorian heresy, according to which there are two persons, as wen as two natures,
in Christ (pp. 979-96); and (viii) that his views about merit, grace, and predestination are
infected with the Pelagian heresy, according to which human beings have a natural
capacity to merit eternal salvation (pp. 1295-1297 and 1345-1347).

3. Expositio in Librum Perihermenias Aristotelis I, Prooemium, § 8 (OP II, pp. 362-63).
This translation and those that follow, both from Ockham and from st. Thomas, are my
own.
4. Summula Philosophiae Naturalis III, chap. 7 (OP VI, p. 270). Signification is, strictly
speaking, a semantic property that categorematic terms have independently of their
occurrence in propositions, while supposition is a semantic property they have as used in
propositions. What these terms signify and supposit for (their significata and supposita)
are always entities. Syncategorematic terms (propositional connectives and operators,
quantifiers, prepositions, conjunctions, etc.) have neither signification (in the strict sense)
nor supposition, even though they affect the truth conditions of the propositions in which
they occur. For more on signification and supposition, see Ockham, SUl/lIna Logicae I,
chap. 33 (OP I, pp. 95-96) and chaps. 63-69 (OP I, pp. 193-209).

5. Medieval scholastics generally hold that Platonic realism runs afoul of the Christian
doctrine that everything other than God depends upon God for its existence. For a recent
dissenting opinion, see Alvin Plantinga, Does God Have a Nature? (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1980).
6. Metaphysical definitions are those formulated in terms of genus and difference. See
Ockham, Summa Logicae I, chap. 26 (OP I, pp. 84-89) and Quodlibeta Septem V, ques.
15 (OT IX, pp. 538-42).
Essential or per se predication has two modes. In the first mode, the predicated term is
included explicitly or implicitly in the subject's metaphysical definition, e.g., 'Human
beings are animals' or 'Human beings are substances.' In the second mode, the predicated
term connotes an essential attribute not included in the definition, e.g., 'Salt is soluble in
water.' Scientific knowledge of a substance includes knowledge of everything that is true
of it per se. In "The Necessity of Nature," Midwest Studies in Philosophy 11 (1986):
215-242, I have defended this conception of scientific knowledge and the corresponding
account of the natural modalities.
7. According to St. Thomas, 'human being' signifies an abstraction, human nature,
which in itself is not properly said to exist or to have any sort of unity. Instead, it always
has, per accidens, one of two types of existence: multiple existence outside the mind in
individual human beings as that which is essential to them as human beings, or unitary
existence in the mind as a universal mental term, 'human being,' that is predicable of
many. See De Elite et Essentia, chaps. 2-3.
8. See Scriptum in Libru/ll Prilllum Sententiarllm: Ordinatio, dist. 2, ques. 4-8 (OT II,
pp. 99-292).
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9. See, for example, Quodlibeta Septem IV, ques. 24 (OT IX, p. 413): "When a
proposition is made true by things, if two things are sufficient for its truth, it is superfluous
to posit a third."

10. Scriptum in Librum Primum Sententiarum: Ordinatio, dist. 2, ques. 4 (OT II, p.
122).
11. On Universals (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1972), p. xii.

12. Ibid., p. 127.

13. See especially OTII, pp. 122-27 and 210-12.
14. An objection: If common terms signify singular things, then their signification will
constantly change as singular things come into and pass out of existence. Ockham replies
that a common term signifies all the things of which it can be truly predicated. (See Summa
Logicae I, chap. 33 (OP I, p. 95).) On pp. 400-16 Adams discusses the question of whether
this and other claims Ockham makes about tense and modality entail the existence of
merely past, merely future, and merely possible entities.
15. Ockham does not claim that every term in the category of quality is absolute. A
quality term is connotative if it can come to be true or cease to be true of a substance
simply because of a spatial rearrangement of the substance's parts. So quality terms like
'curved; 'dense; etc., are connotative, whereas terms that signify colors, habits, dispositions, powers, etc., are absolute. See Summa Logicae I, chap. 55 (OP I, pp. 179-82) and
Quodlibeta Septem VII, ques. 2 (OT IX, pp. 706-8).
16. The accidental categories are all discussed in Summa Logicae I, chaps. 44-62 (OP
I, pp. 132-93). Also, a tract on relations is found in Quodlibeta Septem VI, ques. 8 - VII,
ques. 8 (OT IX, pp. 611-730), while quantity is treated at length in Quodlibeta Septem IV,
chaps. 23-28 (OT IX, pp. 406-45) and in the Tractatus de Quantitate and the Tractatus de
Corpore Christi (both in OT X).
17. Ockham typically uses corresponding pairs of abstract and concrete terms-and not
connotative terms and their nominal definitions-as paradigms of synonymous terms. He
asserts (implausibly) that according to Aristotle kind terms in the category of substance
and their abstract counterparts, e.g., 'animal' and 'animality,' are synonymous, since they
signify exactly the same things in exactly the same way. See, e.g., Summa Logicae I, chap.
7 (OP I, pp. 23-29) and Quodlibeta Septem V, ques. 11 (OTIX, pp. 523-28). On the other
hand, there are places in which Ockham indicates that sameness of nominal definition is
at least a necessary condition for synonymy. See, e.g., Summa Logicae III-2, chap. 14 (OP
I, p. 529) and Quodlibeta Septem IV, ques. 7 (OT IX, p. 334).
18. OT IX, p. 676. See also Expositio in Librum Porphyrii de Praedicalibus, chap. 2,
§ 2 (OP II, pp. 31-32).

19. See Expositio Super Libros Elenchorum II, chap. 16 (OP III, p. 302).

20. OT IX, pp. 582-84.
21. In Chapter 9 St. Thomas divides knowledge of the first principle of all being into
three parts: (i) knowledge of God in Himself, (ii) knowledge of the procession of creatures
from God, and (iii) knowledge of the ordering of creatures to God as an end. These topics
define the first three books of the Summa Contra Gentiles. So the knowledge of God in
the final analysis includes a knowledge of all creatures as well.
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22. This helps explain why st. Thomas denies that one and the same person can have
both faith (fides) and systematic knowledge (scientia) with respect to the same proposition.
The point is sometimes rendered into English as the claim that it is impossible for anyone
both to believe and to know the same proposition, but this is rather misleading given the
standard use of the terms 'believe' and 'know' in contemporary epistemology.
23. An animus against the intrusion of secular philosophy into theology characterizes
many of the most important and influential reactionary movements in Church history, e.g.,
the fourth- and fifth-century resistance to the conciliar definitions of the doctrines of the
Incarnation and the lHnity, at least some elements of the thirteenth-century opposition to
Aristotle, sixteenth-century Lutheranism's call for a return to the Bible, and twentiethcentury Barthian neo-orthodoxy.
24. I am glossing over many complications that a full account of the relation between
faith and reason would have to deal with: How much certitude must a philosophical or
scientific theory have before it necessitates the reformulation of a doctrinal statement that
it appears to conflict with? And how far can such a reformulation go before it is no longer
a reformulation but a repudiation of the doctrine in question? These problems are exacerbated by the fact that what reason normally yields are probabilities rather than certainties.
St. Thomas would win too easy a victory if he only had to show that philosophical or
scientific theories which seem to conflict with doctrine are not demonstrated in the strict
sense. But neither should one be forced on pain of irrationality to accept the most probable
or most popular current theory. I suspect that, as with scientific rationality, advances in
our understanding of theological rationality will depend on close and sophisticated studies
of concrete historical cases.
25. See Quodlibeta Septem I, ques. 1 (OT IX, pp. 1-11). For more discussion of the
arguments for God's existence, uniqueness, and infinity, see Scriptum in Librum Primum
Sententiarum; Ordinatio, dist. 2, ques. 10 (OTII, pp. 337-57) and Quodlibeta Septem II,
ques. 1 (OT IX, pp. 107-11); III, ques. I (OTIX, pp. 199-208); and VII, ques. II-IS (OT
IX, pp. 738-79).
26. See, e.g., SUI/wla Theologiae III, ques. 2, art. 5, ad 1.
27. David Hume, Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, ed. Richard Popkin (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co., 1980), p. 7.

